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The Impact of Banking Crises on Money Demand
and Price Stability
MARIA SOLEDAD MARTÍNEZ PERÍA*
This paper empirically investigates the monetary impact of banking crises in
Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Japan, Kenya, Malaysia, and Uruguay during
1975–98. Cointegration analysis and error correction modeling are used to
research two issues: (i) whether money demand stability is threatened by banking
crises; and (ii) whether crises lead to structural breaks in the relation between
monetary indicators and prices. Overall, no systematic evidence that banking
crises cause money demand instability is found. However, the results on price
stability are mixed; for three out of the seven countries, there appears to be
evidence of instability. [JEL E41, E31, C22]
R
ecent studies reveal that over the last two decades more than 120 countries
experienced some kind of systemic or nonsystemic banking crisis.1
Systemic episodes typically refer to periods of pervasive bank unsoundness
coupled with significant bank runs (or other substantial portfolio shifts), deposit
freezes, bank holidays, collapses of financial firms, and/or massive government
interventions. Nonsystemic crises refer to periods of extensive bank unsoundness
that did not result in any of the events described above. 
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1See Caprio and Klingebiel (1999), and Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal (1996).Banking crises have the potential to complicate the conduct of monetary
policy for a number of reasons. First, these episodes may destabilize money
demand and money multipliers. Second, crises may diminish the effectiveness of
monetary instruments. Third, crises may affect the relation between prices and
monetary indicators—the variables that help monetary authorities monitor and
explain the behavior of prices (e.g., monetary aggregates, interest rates, exchange
rates, etc.). Finally, crises may ultimately reduce the government’s ability to
achieve its inflation objective. 
A number of factors may cause money demand to become unstable during
banking crises. Lack of confidence in the banking sector may cause individuals to
withdraw their deposits from banks and to hold other financial assets instead (like
government bonds) or even real assets. When banking crises are coupled with
currency crises (and especially if dollar deposits are not accepted in local banks),
individuals may prefer to hold foreign currency instead. Such portfolio shifts may
give rise to money demand instability. It is also possible that banking crises may
lead banks themselves to curtail the growth of their assets and their liabilities. For
example, if banks are saddled with nonperforming loans, and consequently choose
to limit the amount of loans they make, the growth of deposits may change dras-
tically simply as a result of a slowdown in the growth of assets, even if banks do
not experience runs on deposits. In this case too, the behavior of broad money
(M2) may become unstable as a result of crises. 
Banking crises may affect the relation between prices and monetary indicators in
a number of ways. Money demand instability may cause monetary aggregates to
become unreliable indicators of price behavior. Market segmentation between sound
and unsound banks may make interest rate signals misleading,since they could reflect
liquidity or solvency problems at particular banks, instead of the overall tightness in
the banking system. Also, during crises, the growth of bank credit may become more
dependent on bank capital levels than on the monetary policy stance. In general, the
transmission of monetary policy through the money supply and interest rates may be
distorted by illiquid or insolvent banks’inability to adjust their reserves or lending to
monetary policy actions and by their diminished sensitivity to interest rate changes. 
Despite the potential adverse impact of banking crises on monetary policy
implementation, this issue has not received much attention in the recent banking
crisis literature.2 Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal (1996), Garcia-Herrero (1997), and
Khamis and Leone (2001) are exceptions. The first two studies present anecdotal
accounts of the monetary impact of banking crises in a sample of countries.
However, they do not examine the consequences of crises in a systematic empir-
ical manner.3 On the other hand, Khamis and Leone (2001) present a thorough
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2For studies that examine the determinants of banking crises see Caprio and Klingebiel (1996, 1999),
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), Eichengreen and Rose (1998), Goldstein and Turner (1996),
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998), and Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal (1996).
3Garcia-Herrero (1997) conducts a Johansen-type cointegration analysis to study long-run money
demand stability in Argentina, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Paraguay, Philippines, and Venezuela. However,
she warns that her analysis is incomplete, and her sample is too short. Short-run money demand dynamics
are also ignored. Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal (1996) cite evidence found by Sundararajan and Baliño (1991)
that broad money demand intercepts and interest rate elasticities change during banking crises. However,
their analysis does not contemplate issues like cointegration and error correction modeling, so it is unclear
whether the equations they base their results on are well specified.empirical analysis of the issue, but focus only on the question of money demand
stability during the 1994 financial crisis in Mexico. 
In the same way that the recent literature on banking crises has largely
neglected to study the monetary consequences of these episodes, existing studies
on money demand and price behavior have not examined the impact of these
crises either. Baba, Hendry, and Starr (1992), Ericsson, Hendry, and Prestwich
(1998), and Ericsson and Sharma (1998) are some of the most notable examples
of money demand models. These studies: (i) address the potential nonstationarity
of the variables that explain money demand; (ii) build error correction models
that control for cointegrating relations among the variables included; and (iii) test
for the constancy of the model parameters over periods of financial innovation
and liberalization.
Regarding the behavior of prices, there is a vast empirical literature on the
“information content” of monetary indicators.4 This literature analyzes the
marginal explanatory power of the variables included in the price equations, over
different periods. For example, a number of studies for the U.S. have examined
whether the information content of money (i.e., its ability to explain prices) has
fallen over time as a result of financial liberalization and innovation, but not finan-
cial crises. Furthermore, these papers have largely ignored issues of stationarity,
cointegration, and parameter stability.
Recently some empirical studies have identified stable price equations for a
number of countries, using cointegration analysis and error correction modeling.
For example, De Brouwer and Ericcson (1998), Durevall (1998), and Juselius
(1992), obtain well specified, constant models for prices in Australia, Brazil, and
Denmark, respectively, over the last three decades. Neither these papers nor the
money demand studies, however, examine the impact of banking crises on the
behavior of prices and the demand for money.
This paper conducts an empirical analysis of the monetary effects of banking
crises. In particular, it concentrates on two issues. First, the paper evaluates the
claim that money demand stability is threatened by the occurrence of banking
crises. It focuses on M2, since the demand for narrow money is more likely to be
affected by financial innovation and deregulation, events that can themselves lead
to instability. Secondly, the paper analyzes the relation between monetary indica-
tors and prices and tests whether crises lead to structural breaks. 
Given that crises have become pervasive in recent decades, understanding
their impact on money demand and prices is becoming increasingly important.
Furthermore, the stability of money demand and price equations is relevant both
from a statistical and economic standpoint. Constancy is required to ensure the
validity of other statistical tests performed. More fundamentally, models that fail
parameter constancy tests cannot be used for forecasting or for analyzing
economic policy. Furthermore, a model can have a high R2, signaling that the
information content of a variable or group of variables is high, yet it may still be
nonconstant and, therefore, unreliable. Thus, whether money demand models and
THE IMPACT OF BANKING CRISES ON MONEY DEMAND AND PRICE STABILITY
269
4See Baumgartner and Ramaswamy (1996), Baumgartner, Ramaswamy, Zettergren (1997), Davis and
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price equations are stable over time is a more relevant question for policymakers
than whether the information content of certain monetary indicators varies over
different samples. As long as money demand and price equations remain stable
over crisis periods, policymakers can continue to rely on the precrisis models to
forecast the behavior of these variables and to analyze the impact of different poli-
cies adopted during or after crises. 
Focusing on the experience of seven countries over the period from 1975 to
1998, this study analyzes the monetary consequences of banking crises in Chile
(1981–87), Colombia (1982–88), Denmark (1987–92), Japan (1992–98), Kenya
(1985–89 and 1992–95), Malaysia (1985–88), and Uruguay (1981–85). The dates
in parentheses correspond to the periods identified by Caprio and Klingebiel
(1996) and Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal (1996) as banking crisis episodes.
The sample in this paper is restricted to only seven countries due to data
constraints and because the detailed empirical methodology pursued makes it
difficult to implement this approach for a larger number of countries. Though
limited, this sample is diverse in that it covers a number of geographical regions,
focuses on countries with banking sectors of different sizes, and includes both
developing and developed countries.5 Developing countries tend to be more
volatile than developed countries, and governments in the former set of countries
usually have fewer policy tools at their disposal.6 Thus, it is interesting to study
whether there are systemic differences in the monetary impact of crises across
these groups of countries. 
For each country, cointegration analysis and error correction modeling are
used to obtain appropriate dynamic specifications for money and prices. Parameter
constancy tests are conducted on the estimated money demand equations to study
whether money demand becomes unstable during crisis periods. Finally, param-
eter constancy tests are also performed to determine whether crises cause struc-
tural breaks in the relation between prices and monetary indicators. 
With the exception of Uruguay, no systemic cross-country evidence is found
that banking crises cause money demand instability in the sample.7 Also, the
paper finds that money, exchange rates, foreign prices, and domestic interest
rates are significant indicators of price behavior, even during crisis periods.
Finally, the results on price stability are mixed. While most of the coefficients in
the price equations are not affected by banking crises, for three of the seven
countries, evidence of instability (primarily variance nonconstancy) is found in
these equations.
5As measured by the proportion of banking sector assets to GDP in the five years prior to the banking
crises, the banking sectors in the seven countries ranked as follows in size: Japan (128 percent), Denmark
(56 percent), Malaysia (51 percent), Uruguay (24 percent), Kenya (23 percent), Chile (18 percent), and
Colombia (13 percent). These estimates come from Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (1999).
6In general, developing countries have a harder time borrowing in international markets, are constrained
by large deficits, and are less capable of exercising monetary independence (see Calvo and Reinhart, 2000).
7Khamis and Leone (2001) find a similar result for the demand for currency money in Mexico.THE IMPACT OF BANKING CRISES ON MONEY DEMAND AND PRICE STABILITY
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I. An Anatomy of the Crises Under Study
This section presents a summary of the causes, scope, and monetary impact of the
banking crises under study.8 In particular, it focuses on the salient features of these
crises, trying to draw similarities across countries where appropriate and to high-
light differences when these are significant. 
Causes 
Most of the crises studied coincided with business cycle downturns brought about
by external and/or internal factors. In all cases, the deterioration in economic
conditions severely weakened the health of the financial institutions in these coun-
tries, precipitating the banking crises that followed.
In Chile, for example, following five years of rapid growth (averaging 8
percent annually), macroeconomic conditions shifted by the end of the 1970s. As
the price of copper (Chile’s main export at the time) collapsed, international
interest rates rose, and foreign capital inflows shrank; the economy entered into a
recession in 1982–83.
In Colombia, growth decelerated sharply between 1981–82. After reaching
rates of 4 percent or higher every year since the mid-1970s, real GDP growth
decelerated to 2 percent in 1981 and only 1 percent in 1982.
In Uruguay, both policy inconsistencies and external factors led to a rapid
deterioration in Uruguay’s economic and financial performance beginning in the
late 1970s. In large measure as a result of the recession in the world economy and
due to policy adjustments undertaken by Argentina and Brazil, demand for
Uruguayan exports weakened. Adverse terms of trade shocks, together with rising
world interest rates, negatively impacted the current account and output growth.
Real GDP growth decelerated to about 2 percent in 1981, and in 1982, GDP
declined by almost 10 percent.
Kenya faced a macroeconomic crisis in 1993. A number of factors contributed
to this episode. First, Kenya suffered multiple exogenous shocks including irreg-
ular rainfalls, a large influx of refugees from neighboring countries, and substan-
tial declines in export prices. Second, balance of payments assistance provided by
bilateral donors was suspended in late 1991 due to donors’ concern over political
and economic reforms. Third, difficulties in government budgetary management
and inefficiencies in the public enterprise sector escalated in the early 1990s. As a
result of these factors, real GDP growth decelerated from 4.3 percent in 1990 to
close to zero in 1992/93. 
8Among other references cited, this section draws heavily on a number of IMF reports (entitled
“Recent Economic Developments”) for the seven countries included in the paper. Also, the following
studies served as references for this section: Brownbridge (1998), Caprio and Klingebiel (1996),
Dominioni and Licandro (1989), Geraghty (1987), Hausmann and Rojas-Suarez (1996), Koskenkyla
(1994), Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal (1996), Machua (1986), Mbitiru (1986), Sheng, (1996), and
Sundararajan and Baliño (1991). In Denmark, Japan, and Malaysia, the collapse of stock and real estate price
bubbles also contributed to the ensuing banking problems. In the first case, the rapid
deregulation of credit and foreign exchange controls in the 1980s, combined with an
economic boom, tax breaks on borrowing, and the fact that interest rates lagged
collateral asset value growth, led banks to reckless lending on a grand scale in the
mid-1980s. In the late 1980s, early 1990, as a result of recession, business failures,
and the collapse of property and other asset markets, the Danish financial system
sustained considerable losses. In Malaysia, fast monetary and credit growth, along
with large fiscal deficits in the early 1980s, stimulated inflation and price bubbles in
the stock and real estate markets. During this period, banks’ exposure to the real
estate sector also grew considerably. The countercyclical policies that followed led
to a recession in 1985–86 and the subsequent bubble burst. By 1986, real estate
prices had declined by 60–70 percent relative to 1983. The plunge in real estate
prices had a devastating impact on banks’ lending portfolios. Similarly, in Japan, a
sustained strong economic expansion during 1987–90 raised resource utilization and
resulted in an increase in inflationary pressures. The overheating of the economy
prompted a tightening of monetary policy. As monetary policy was tightening, finan-
cial markets came under strong pressure. Interest rates rose steadily, stock market
prices plummeted. Annualized GDP growth decelerated sharply from 51/2 percent in
the first half of the year to less than 1 percent in the second half.
Microeconomic factors like risky lending practices, poor regulation, and weak
supervision also played a role in most of the crises studied in this paper. According
to Montes-Negret (1996), although a downturn in economic conditions might have
precipitated bank failures in Colombia, the high concentration of bank loan port-
folios was the most important reason for the insolvencies. Other contributing
factors included weak supervision along with inadequate legal and institutional
arrangements. Fraud, bad credit decisions, undercapitalization of banks and their
corporate customers, the failure of overseas affiliates and subsidiaries, and
increasing operational and financial cost also played a role. Similarly, Pérez-
Campanero and Leone (1991) note that weak regulatory, accounting, and supervi-
sory frameworks were also behind Uruguay’s financial system problems. In the
case of Chile, according to Velasco (1991), legislation curtailing excessive risk
taking and unsound lending patterns was weak or nonexistent until 1980. Thus,
related lending, rolling over of credits, and capitalization of interests were common
practices. In Kenya, unorthodox financial practices of some nonbank financial
institutions and commercial banks led to a serious crisis in the financial system in
1986. In the 1990s, aside from the adverse macroeconomic conditions, discre-
tionary exemption of banking act provisions and unsound banking practices
(including inside lending or directed lending to parastatals) left banks with large
portfolios of nonperforming loans and illiquid or insolvent conditions.
Scope
While there are many similarities across countries in the causes behind crises,
there is a lot more diversity concerning the scope and costs of these episodes.
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and the size of the banking sector prior to these episodes.
Crises appear to have been more damaging and systemic in Chile, Kenya (in
the 1990s), Japan, and Uruguay and significantly less so in the case of Denmark
and Kenya (in the 1980s). Crises in Colombia and Malaysia rank somewhere in
between.
In Chile the authorities intervened in four banks and four nonbank financial
institutions (with 33 percent of outstanding loans) in 1981. Nine other banks
and two more nonbanks (with 45 percent of outstanding loans) were subject 
to intervention in 1982–83. At the end of 1983, 21 percent of loans were non-
performing.
In Colombia, between 1982 and 1983, the monetary authorities had to take
over temporarily the management of three banks and eight trade financing corpo-
rations, liquidate one bank and two specialized banks, and nationalize two
commercial banks (one of them was the largest in the country). Approximately 15
percent of loans were nonperforming in 1984–85.
In Denmark, between 1990 and 1992, 9 percent of loans were nonperforming.
Forty out of 60 problem banks (out of a total of 200) were merged.
In Kenya, in the mid-1980s, two commercial banks and three nonbank
financial institutions were suspended. In the early 1990s, one third of the banks
in Kenya (accounting for 63 percent of banking assets) were identified as
distressed.
According to Kanaya and Woo (2001), between 1992 and 1997, Japan
witnessed a slew of financial institution failures. Seven home mortgage-lending
institutions (jusens) were dissolved during this period. In 1994, four credit coop-
eratives were suspended. Seven high profile financial institutions went into effec-
tive bankruptcy in 1997, and in 1998, two large banks were nationalized.
In the case of Malaysia, during 1985–86, there were sporadic bank runs, and
a number of deposit-taking institutions failed. The authorities intervened in three
banks, four finance houses, 24 deposit-taking cooperatives, and 14 insurance
companies. Nonperforming loans in Malaysia were estimated at 32 percent of total
loans in 1988.
Between 1984 and 1987, the central bank of Uruguay intervened in five
domestic banks and de facto nationalized 75 percent of total deposits. In 1985,
nonperforming loans reached 45 percent.
Aside from the percentage of loans impaired during crises, the fiscal and
output costs of crises are two other measures of the depth of these episodes. The
fiscal costs of crises refer to the resources (typically expressed as a percentage
of GDP) spent by governments in “cleaning up” the financial system. Primarily,
governments invest resources by injecting liquidity into the system, in
purchasing nonperforming loans, and in recapitalizing problem banks.
Honohan and Klingebiel (2000) estimate the fiscal cost of the crises in Chile,
Colombia, Japan, Malaysia, and Uruguay to be 41, 5, 20, 5, and 31 percent of
GDP, respectively.
An alternative measure of the cost of crises is the forgone output growth that
occurs as a consequence of these episodes. Bordo and others (2001) obtain
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estimates of such costs for a sample of 54 countries for the period 1973–97.9These
estimates are calculated by accumulating the difference between trend growth
before crises and the growth observed during these episodes. Consistent with the
other measures of the cost of crises, the output costs appear to have been larger in
Chile, Japan, and Uruguay, reaching 25, 20, and 32 percentage points, respec-
tively, relative to Colombia, Denmark, and Malaysia, where they approximated 10,
18, and 14 percentage points, respectively. 
According to Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (1999), the ratio of bank
assets to GDP in the years prior to the banking crises averaged 18 percent in Chile,
13 percent in Colombia, 56 percent in Denmark, 128 percent in Japan, 23 percent
in Kenya, 51 percent in Malaysia, and 24 percent in Uruguay. Given the existing
estimates of the cost of crises in these countries, there does not appear to be a clear
pattern linking the latter to the size of the banking sector. 
Monetary Impact: A Preliminary Analysis
A preliminary analysis of the impact of banking crises on money demand and
price stability is conducted by analyzing the behavior of the growth of real broad
money (M2) and the correlation between money and prices before, during, and
after crises. Figures 1A through 1G illustrate the behavior of the 12-month growth
in real M2, in each of the countries under study. Figures 2A through 2G show the
12-month rolling correlation between prices and M2. 
In the case of Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Japan, and Uruguay, the growth of
real M2 rises prior to the banking crises and falls during these periods.
Furthermore, for most of these countries, crises are among the few episodes where
this type of pattern is observed. However, the amplitude of the cycles varies signif-
icantly across these countries. 
After growing at an annual average rate close to 50 percent, real M2 growth
in Chile became negative at the height of the crisis, averaging –30 percent during
1983. The banking crisis is the only period during which the growth of real M2 in
Chile became negative.
In the case of Colombia, the fall in real M2 growth was less sharp and also not
exclusive to the banking crisis in the early 1980s. While real M2 was growing at
a rate above 20 percent at the beginning of the 1980s, growth dropped to –3
percent towards the middle of 1983. Though the growth of real M2 in Colombia
was never again as high as during the years right before the banking crisis, it did
experience periods of negative growth other than the banking crisis of the early
1980s. In the early and late 1990s, real growth of M2 became negative for a brief
period. 
Large upswings in the growth of real M2 prior to the banking crisis are also
evident in the case of Denmark. Between 1983 and 1986, real M2 growth in this
9They also provide estimates of the output cost of crises for a subset of 21 countries for the period
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Figure 1. Annualized Growth Rate of Real M2
Figures show the 12-month’s growth rate of real M2. Periods in bold correspond to banking crisis
episodes.Maria Soledad Martínez Pería
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Figure 2. Twelve-Month’s Rolling Correlation Between Prices and M2
Periods in bold indicate banking crisis periods.country soared to almost 20 percent. As banking problems surfaced in the late
1980s to early 1990s, real M2 growth plummeted, becoming negative at the start
of the 1990s. 
The growth of real M2 in Japan followed a similar pattern, rising significantly
in the mid-1980s and falling sharply during the crisis period. In this case, growth
prior to the crisis reached almost 12 percent in 1987, falling to approximately –2
percent in late 1992.
In Uruguay, the growth of real M2 went from almost 25 percent in 1982 to –50
percent in the mid-1980s.
In the case of the Kenyan 1990s crisis and in Malaysia during the mid-1980s,
though real M2 growth did not increase as sharply prior to the banking crisis rela-
tive to other noncrisis periods, real money growth did fall during these episodes.
In Kenya, real money growth reached –20 percent during 1994–95. On the other
hand, no drop is observed in real M2 growth during the period of bank distress that
took place in the mid-1980s.
While there is interest in the stability of the relation between prices and all
types of monetary indicators (i.e., monetary aggregates, interest rates, exchange
rates, etc.), this section focuses exclusively on the correlation between M2 and
prices. The focus on broad money is explained by the fact that most of the coun-
tries in the sample, prior to the crises, either directly targeted M2 or monitored it
closely as a key indicator of price behavior.10 A formal test of the stability of the
relation of prices and a host of monetary indicators is conducted in the sections
that follow. 
With the exception of Colombia—where the correlation between money and
prices barely changed (and was close to 1) throughout the sample—this statistic
dropped abruptly at times of crises (see Figures 2A–2G). In the case of Chile,
Japan, Kenya, and Malaysia this correlation was above 0.8 for most noncrisis
periods, but became negative during crises. In the case of Denmark and Uruguay,
the correlations fell significantly during the crises, but much less sharply than in
the previous cases. 
To summarize, crises in the seven sample countries were the consequence of
both adverse macroeconomic conditions and weak microeconomic environments.
While there are many similarities among the countries in the factors that led to the
crises, the scope and cost estimates vary significantly across countries. Crises
appear to have been more severe in Chile, Kenya, Japan, and Uruguay. At first
glance, episodes of banking distress appear to destabilize the behavior of mone-
tary aggregates and the relation between them and prices. Causal observations
suggests that there might be a link between the extent of these monetary conse-
quences and the cost or severity of crises. However, no clear pattern is observed
between the size of the banking sector on the one hand and the costs and mone-
tary consequences of crises on the other. 
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10This statement is based on information gathered from a number of IMF reports for each of the coun-
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II. Empirical Methodology and Data
While in the preceding section it was found that, for most countries in the sample,
real M2 growth fell sharply during crises, the exercise is not a precise test of
money demand stability. To the extent that these sharp movements in real money
can be explained by factors typically associated with changes in money demand,
then the money demand function may still prove to be stable. Similarly, a simple
correlation between prices and money cannot fully detect whether the relation
between these variables is statistically and formally unstable.
To  empirically examine the monetary impact of banking crises, dynamic
money demand and price (inflation) equations are estimated using monthly data
for each country over the period 1975–98.11, 12 The purpose of estimating these
equations is twofold. First, to determine whether money demand stability is
threatened by banking crises, and second, to test whether crises cause a structural
break in the relation between monetary indicators and prices. 
Following Juselius (1992), domestic prices in each country are modeled as a
function of monetary, external, and cost-push (labor market driven) factors. In
other words, consumer price inflation is assumed to be associated with wage (cost-
push) inflation, monetary inflation, and imported inflation. Wage inflation refers
to a situation where wages are above the underlying steady-state level. Monetary
inflation is associated with excess money, while exchange rate depreciations and
foreign price surges drive imported inflation. Since the determination of exchange
rates can take place in both the goods and the capital markets, it is necessary to
account for the interaction between them to capture the external effects on prices. 
Empirical Approach
The empirical analysis pursued involves a number of steps. First, unit root tests are
conducted to determine whether the variables included in the empirical analysis
are stationary. Second, cointegration relations between prices and the monetary,
cost-push, and external factors that determine prices are tested for. Third, single
equation error correction models are obtained for money and prices. Finally,
278
11The sample for individual countries might be smaller than 1975–98, depending on data availability.
See the data appendix.
12A number of studies have estimated money demand and inflation models for the seven countries
considered in this paper (Chile: see Apt and Quiroz, 1992; Martner and Titelman, 1993; and Matte and
Rojas, 1989. Colombia: see Fullerton, 1993; Herrera and Julio, 1993; and Wunder, 1990. Denmark: see
Juselius, 1988, 1989, 1992, 1993, and 1998. Japan: see Arize, 1990; Arize, Avard, and Ukpolo, 1997;
Corker, 1990; Frowen and Buscher, 1990; Hutchinson, 1998; Tamura, 1992; and Yoshida, 1990. Kenya:
see Adam, 1992a and b; Chakrabarti and Ali, 1992; Darrat, 1985; Fielding, 1994; Karatzas, 1993; and
Njuguna, 1993.  Malaysia: Abdullah and Yusop, 1996; Dhakal, Kandil, Sharma, and Trescott, 1993;
Habibulla, 1990; and Yusoff, 1988. Uruguay:G raziani, 1988; Perez-Campanero and Leone, 1991; and
Wonsewer, 1986). However, most of these studies ignore issues like stationarity, cointegration, and param-
eter stability. More importantly, these existing studies do not analyze the impact of banking crises on
money demand and price equations.parameter constancy tests are conducted to examine whether banking crises affect
the stability of the money demand and price (inflation) equations. 
As in Juselius (1992) and Durevall (1998), the cointegration analysis is
conducted for each sector (monetary, labor, and external) separately, for a number
of reasons.13 In the first place, the data sample is not large enough to examine
systems with as many as ten variables. Secondly, as Juselius (1992) notes, it
becomes increasingly difficult to interpret the cointegration space as the number
of variables added in the VAR grows. Finally, even though the cointegration anal-
ysis is conducted for each sector separately, the analysis is still able to capture
most of the economically meaningful long-run relations that might affect prices
and money demand.
Testing for unit roots and cointegration are necessary steps to ensure that well
specified models are obtained for money and prices, which take into account any
nonstationarity in the regressors, as well as any long-run equilibrium conditions
between the variables in the models. However, since the crux of this paper is the
analysis of the stability of money demand and prices, the reader is referred to the
working paper version of this study (Martínez Pería, 2000) for a detailed account
of the unit root and cointegration tests. 
The cointegration relations for the monetary sector reveal the factors that
affect the long-term demand for money. However, in the short run, deviations from
these relations could occur as a result of shocks to any of the relevant variables.
Thus, after testing for cointegration in the monetary sector, an error correction
model (ECM) for money is estimated for each country in the sample. This equa-
tion allows for the examination of the short-run and long-run dynamics of money
demand. The conditional ECM for money is of the form:
(1)
where ω t is a white noise error term. ∆ m, ∆ p, ∆ y, and ∆ e are the changes in the loga-
rithm of nominal M2, prices, a measure of income (usually industrial production),
and the dollar exchange rate, respectively. ∆ I
o is the change in the rate of return on
M2 (in most cases an average deposit rate), and ∆ I
a is the change in the return on
alternative assets to those included in M2, such as government bonds or bills. For
those countries where there is evidence that money and prices are I(2), the change
in nominal money (∆ m) is replaced by the change in real money (∆ (m–p)), and the
change in prices (∆ p) is replaced by the change in the inflation rate (∆ 2p). Finally,
adjustments in response to deviations of money demand from its long-run equilib-
rium are taken into account by including the cointegration vectors found for the
monetary sector. ECmoney refers to these cointegrating vectors.
∆∆ ∆∆∆
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13The analysis of the labor sector is admittedly limited, given that it does not have monthly informa-
tion on labor productivity. Instead, productivity is modeled by including a time trend.Similarly, an ECM is developed to analyze the short-run and long-run deter-
minants of prices (or inflation). This error correction model incorporates the coin-
tegrating vectors found for the monetary (ECmoney), labor (ECwages), and
external sectors (ECexternal). The ECM for prices is of the form:
where ν t is a white noise error term. ∆ w, ∆ u, ∆ p*, and ∆ sp refer to the change in
the logarithm of wages, unemployment rates, foreign prices, and stock prices,
respectively. ∆ I* refers to the change in the foreign interest rate. Foreign prices
and interest rates refer to those for the U.S. in all cases except for Denmark, where
the benchmark foreign country is Germany. The remaining variables are defined
above. In those cases where money, prices, and wages are I(2), the first differences
of these variables (i.e., ∆ mt, ∆ pt,a n d   ∆ wt) are replaced by their second differences
(i.e., ∆ 2mt, ∆ 2pt, and ∆ 2wt,r espectively).
After estimating the ECM equations for money and prices, these models are
reduced to obtain parsimonious representations for these variables. In other words,
all insignificant variables and lags are excluded. Starting with the largest reason-
able number of lags, at each stage, F-tests are conducted to compare the previous
model with the latest reduced version of the model. Also, the latest version of the
model is compared with the initial and all intermediate versions in order to verify
that the restrictions implied by the reduced model are indeed accepted. For
example, starting with a model including 13 lags, the model can be simplified to
10 lags if it is possible to accept going from 13 to 12 lags, from 13 and 12 to 11,
and from 13, 12, and 11 to 10.14
Once the final reduced models are obtained, the stability of individual coef-
ficients as well as the overall stability of the single equations for money and
prices are investigated. To examine the stability of individual coefficients two
tests are reported, namely, the Hansen (1992) test for coefficient stability and a
t-test of the interaction of each variable with a dummy equal to one during the
crisis period. The Hansen test “is approximately the Lagrange multiplier test of
the null of constant parameter against the alternative that the parameter in ques-
tion follows a martingale. This alternative incorporates simple structural breaks
of unknown timing as well as random walk parameters” (p. 520). This test exam-
ines the null of constancy, but it is not designed to determine the timing of the
structural breaks. Therefore, in order to analyze whether indeed coefficient insta-
bility arises from the banking crisis period, each coefficient is interacted with a
Maria Soledad Martínez Pería
280
14These tests are available upon request.
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(2)dummy that equals one during the crisis period. A significant interaction term
indicates that the coefficient in question is statistically different during crisis
periods, relative to tranquil ones.
It is possible that even if it is found that some coefficients are unstable, the
overall stability of the equation, which takes into account the joint hypotheses
that all coefficients and the variance of the equation are stable, could still be
accepted. The reverse situation, where individual parameters are stable but
overall stability is rejected, is also possible. Thus, three kinds of tests are
performed to study the overall stability of the money and price equations. First,
Hansen’s (1992) variance and joint-error variance and coefficient-stability tests
are performed. These tests consider the null that either the variance or all coef-
ficients (instead of individual ones) together with the equation variance are
stable. Secondly, sequentially estimated one-period ahead and break-point Chow
(1960) statistics are presented. Third, to test whether the instability arises explic-
itly from the crisis period, a Chow-type F-test is reported, which is labeled F-
CRISIS. This test compares the equations estimated over the whole sample (i.e.,
the sample including crisis and tranquil periods) with the estimates for the
period excluding banking crises.15 Because the Hansen, one-period ahead and
break-point Chow tests do not assume instability over a particular period, but
rather the timing of structural breaks is unknown, they tend to be less powerful.
Thus, whenever different results emerge from these tests, vis-à-vis the F-CRISIS
test, the tendency is for the latter to be relied upon.
The Data
Monthly data on monetary aggregates and financial variables (like exchange rates
and interest rates) come from national sources (e.g., Central Bank bulletins,
Ministry of Finance reports, etc.) and international sources (IMF and OECD
databases). Wherever possible, the analysis also controls for the role of wages,
the unemployment rate, and external factors (like foreign prices and interest
rates) in explaining prices. These variables come from the same sources
mentioned above. For all countries, an attempt is made to cover the period closest
to January 1975 through June 1998. A data appendix, at the end of the paper,
describes the data used, the corresponding sources, and the relevant sample
periods for each country in the study.
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15See Greene (1993, p. 214) for a description of this type of test. The idea is that whenever we want
to test whether the behavior of an equation over two subperiods is the same when one period is too short
to be considered separately, this difference can be tested indirectly by comparing the overall period with
the longer subperiod. Thus, the procedure is as follows: (1) estimate the regression using the full data set
and obtain the restricted sum of squared residuals er′ er; (2) estimate the regression over the longer subpe-
riod and obtain the unrestricted sum of squared residuals er′ er; (3) calculate the F-statistic as follows,
F[n1, n2–K] = [(er′ er – e′ e)/n1]/[ e′ e /(n2–K)], where n1 is the number of observations in the shortest
subperiod and n2 corresponds to the number of observations in the longer subperiod. III. Empirical Results
The paper’s main objective is to examine money demand and price stability during
banking crises. However, getting to that stage requires that the stationarity of the
variables in the models is ensured, that cointegration among the different variables
is tested for, and that cointegrating vectors are included (to control for long-run
relations among the variables) in the single equation models for money and prices.
Martínez Pería (2000) presents the unit root test results for all variables used, and
shows and discusses the Johansen cointegration tests for the monetary, external,
and labor sectors, for all countries. Tables A1 and A2 in the appendix summarize
the order of integration of the variables included and detail the number of cointe-
gration vectors found for each sector in each country, respectively. Table A3
displays the actual cointegrating vectors found for each sector in each country.
Most variables are integrated of order (1) and in some cases of order (2). Thus,
stationary variables are obtained by first differencing I(1) variables and by differ-
encing twice those that are I(2). In all cases, one vector is found with a long-run
money demand interpretation. For most countries, the cointegration results for the
external sector confirm that purchasing power parity (PPP) holds in the long run.
In some cases, it is also found that uncovered interest parity (UIP) holds. Finally,
for those countries where data on wages exist, real wages are found to be linked
in the long run to the behavior of the unemployment rate and to a trend, which is
interpreted as a proxy for productivity growth.
Is the Stability of Money Demand Affected by Banking Crises?
In this section, the results for the parsimonious, conditional, single-equation
model for broad money demand are presented and discussed for each country in
the sample. In all cases, the analysis began with a 13-lag model and dropped those
lags that could be excluded according to a series of F-tests and the behavior of the
Schwarz criterion.16
To  verify that the final money demand equations for each country are well
specified, panel A of Table 1 presents various diagnostic statistics. These statistics
are tests against various alternative hypotheses such as residual autocorrelation
(AR), skewness and excess kurtosis (Normality), autoregressive conditional
heteroskedasticity (ARCH), and heteroscedasticity (Hetero). The null distribution
of these statistics is either chi-squared (χ 2) or F depending on the test. The degrees
of freedom are shown in parentheses. All equations, for all countries, are well
specified except for the fact that there is some evidence of residual autocorrelation
for Japan. 
Having shown that all equations appear to be well specified, Table 2 summa-
rizes the main results from the final money demand equations for each country.
This table indicates the sign of each coefficient, whether they are statistically
significant, and whether they are stable according to the Hansen test and the
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tsignificance of the crisis dummy interaction terms. Detailed regression results can
be found in Martínez Pería (2000).17
Except for Colombia and Kenya, in all countries, inflation (∆ p), or the change
in inflation (∆ 2p), is significant and has a negative effect on the demand for real
money, as expected. In general, the coefficient on this variable appears to be stable
according to the Hansen test. Also, the interaction term between inflation and a
crisis dummy is insignificant for all countries (at 5 percent significance), indi-
cating that there is no evidence of instability on this coefficient that can be
attributed to the crisis period.  
In general, changes in income (y) have a positive effect on the demand for
money. However, income is only significant in the money demand equations for
Chile and Malaysia. According to the interaction term between the change in
income and the crisis dummy, the coefficient on income is unstable for the case of
Japan and Malaysia. The rate of return on M2, I
o (typically the average deposit
rate), has a positive and significant impact on the demand for broad money in
Chile, Kenya, and Uruguay. A higher return on money raises the demand for it, as
expected. This variable is insignificant for all other countries. At 5 percent signif-
icance, no evidence is found of coefficient instability for the rate of return on M2.
Changes in the rate of return on assets outside from those included in M2 
(indicated as I
a) have a significant negative impact on money demand in Denmark
and Kenya. There is no evidence of coefficient instability for this variable either.
With the exception of Japan, the change in the exchange rate (∆ e) is included
as a regressor in the single equation for money for all countries. This variable is
introduced to control for the possibility of flight to foreign currency in countries
where there are not a lot of competing assets relative to bank deposits, and/or
where the exchange rate has been traditionally pegged to a foreign currency.18
Exchange rate changes are mostly significant and have a negative impact on the
demand for broad money in Colombia, Denmark, and Kenya.19 At 5 percent
significance, there is some evidence that the coefficients on some lags of the
exchange rate are unstable in the case of Denmark and Kenya.
As mentioned above, it is possible that the stability of some specific coeffi-
cients is rejected, while the overall stability of the money demand equation is still
accepted. If the structural stability of money demand is unaffected by banking
crises, then policymakers can continue to rely on these models for forecasting and
for economic policy analysis. Thus, one-period ahead and break-point Chow tests,
Hansen tests, and F-tests are conducted to examine the overall stability of the
money demand equations. 
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17The error correction terms associated with long-run money demand are included as controls, but are
not discussed in Table 2. In general, these terms are significant and negative in the dynamic money
demand equations for all countries. In most cases, however, adjustment to the long-run equilibrium is
slow. 
18The change in the exchange rate was not included in the cointegration analysis, because this vari-
able was found to be I(0) for all countries according to the Dickey-Fuller (1981) tests.
19An increase in the exchange rate represents a depreciation.Figures 3A through Figure 3H show sequentially estimated one-period ahead
and break-point Chow statistics for each money demand function.20 These results
are summarized in panel A of Table 3. Also, this table reports the Hansen (1992)
variance and joint (coefficient and variance) tests for parameter constancy. Finally,
aside from testing for unknown break-points in the money demand equations, tests
are conducted to determine whether the models estimated for the overall sample
(i.e., including tranquil and crisis observations) are equivalent to those estimated
over the period excluding banking crisis episodes. These episodes are identified
according to the dates established in the banking crisis literature (see Caprio and
Klingebiel (1996, 1999) and Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal (1996)). This test statistic,
which is labeled F-CRISIS, has an F distribution.21 If this F-test rejects, then it can
be inferred that the instability in the money demand function arises from the
period of the banking crisis, since the only difference between the overall sample
and the sample excluding the crisis, is the crisis period itself.
According to the recursively estimated Chow, Hansen, and F-CRISIS tests,
money demand functions in Chile, Denmark, and Malaysia appear to be stable.22
So, from these results, it seems that banking crises in these countries have not
threatened the stability of broad money demand.
The Hansen tests, as well as the one-period ahead and break-point Chow tests,
provide evidence of parameter instability in the estimated money demand equation
for Colombia. However, the instability in the equation seems to be coming from
the period after the banking crisis. The Colombian banking crisis took place
between 1982–87. When the model is estimated through 1989, rather than the
overall sample 1981–98, no evidence of instability is found according to the
Hansen and Chow tests (see panel A in Table 3 and Figure 1c). Furthermore, the
F-CRISIS test also accepts the null of constancy over the crisis period. 
Whether the money demand for Japan is stable or not is unclear. The Hansen
tests definitely support stability. The one-period ahead and the break-point Chow
tests point to some periods of instability, but they are definitely few and short
lived. The F-CRISIS test rejects stability, but only at 10 percent significance.
Overall, the evidence in favor of instability is not overwhelming.
The one-period ahead and, in particular, the break-point Chow tests provide
some evidence of money demand instability in Kenya. However, the evidence is
very marginal at 5 percent significance. Furthermore, the Hansen stability tests
and the F-CRISIS statistic indicate that the equation is stable. So, overall, there is
an inclination to interpret the results for Kenya as accepting the hypothesis of
money demand stability.
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20The recursively estimated Chow tests are only useful in those cases when they include the crisis
periods. In some countries, however, because the data sample starts well into the crisis, the recursive esti-
mates start after the crisis period or well into it. In these cases, the F-CRISIS and Hansen tests are relied
upon.
21The degrees of freedom in the numerator correspond to the number of observations in the crisis
period, and those in the denominator are equal to the degrees of freedom of the model estimated over the
tranquil period. 
22In the case of Chile, some one-period ahead Chow statistics reject at 5 percent, but they are too few


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)The stability test results for the Uruguayan money equation are mixed. On the
one hand, the Hansen tests accept stability, but the F-CRISIS test rejects it. Given
that the Hansen tests typically have low power, because the break-point is
unknown, the F-CRISIS test results tend to be more heavily relied upon. The one-
period ahead and break-point Chow tests are not particularly useful in this case,
because the recursive estimations conducted to obtain these tests start after the
crisis period. It is clear from these figures, however, in particular from the residual
bands, that the estimation in the 1980s is less precise and stable than during the
1990s. This suggests that the banking crisis during the period 1981–85 may have
affected money demand stability in Uruguay.
To  summarize, the results in this section show that with the exception of
Uruguay, no overwhelming evidence is found that banking crises jeopardize broad
money demand stability.23 The evidence presented here, together with the fact that
Maria Soledad Martínez Pería
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Table 3. Summary Table for Money Demand and Price Stability Tests
A. Money Demand Stability Tests
Recursive
Squares Hansen Test
Country Chow Tests Variance Joint F-CRISIS
Chile Stable1 0.163 3.999 1.343
Colombia
Entire Sample Unstable 0.714* 4.758 0.572
1982:3–1989:12 Stable2 0.086 4.29
Denmark Stable 0.102 4.238 1.154
Japan Stable 0.189 3.495 1.334
Kenya Stable 0.096 3.705 1.063
Malaysia Stable 0.222 4.655 0.66
Uruguay Stable1 0.227 4.965 2.269**
B. Price Equations Stability Tests
Chile Stable 0.298 5.674 0.963
Colombia Stable1 1.035* 6.754 2.545**
Denmark Stable 0.259 4.813 0.754
Japan Stable 0.523* 7.961 0.855
Kenya
Entire Sample Unstable 0.491* 4.327 1.439*
1980s 0.748
1990s 2.163**
Malaysia Stable 0.355 5.315 0.736
Uruguay Stable1 0.21 5.568 2.142**
Notes: *, ** denotes significance at 5 percent and 1 percent, respectively.
1The recursive estimation does not include the crisis period. 
2 The overall instability in the sample comes from the period after the crisis. 
23In the case of Colombia, evidence of instability was found, but it seems to be arising in the 1990s,
many years after the financial crisis in that country.for all countries a cointegration vector is found with a long-run money demand
interpretation, indicates that whatever changes may have occurred in the demand
for money owing to banking crises can be explained by the same function used to
model money demand at times of tranquility. Thus, at least for this sample of
countries, banking crises do not systematically threaten the short-run or long-run
broad money demand functions.
Does the Relation Between Prices and Monetary Indicators Break
Down During Crises?
Starting from a model including 13 lags of each variable, the reduced and final
equation for prices in each country are obtained by dropping insignificant lags
according to a series of F-tests and the behavior of the Schwarz criterion. That the
final equations are well specified is confirmed by conducting diagnostic tests for
residual autocorrelation (AR), skewness and excess kurtosis (Normality), autore-
gressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH), and heteroscedasticity (Hetero).
The results from these tests are summarized in panel B of Table 1. None of the
price equations reject any of these specification tests. Thus, all price equations
seem to be free of specification problems.
Table 4 presents a summary of the results from the estimated price equations.
In particular, this table indicates the sign of each variable included, whether the
variable is significant or not, and whether the coefficient on each variable is stable
or not according to the Hansen stability test and the crisis dummy interaction term.
A detailed set of results for the price equations can be found in Martínez Pería
(2000).24
In the parsimonious price equations, lagged changes in broad money (or the
second difference, depending on the order of integration of the variables) are
found to have a positive and significant impact on inflation (or its growth rate,
depending on the country) in Chile, Denmark, Japan, Kenya, and Uruguay. The
interaction terms between money and the crisis dummy provide some evidence of
instability for Japan and Uruguay at 5 percent significance. 
For Denmark, Japan, and Uruguay, positive changes in income exercise a
significant upward pressure on prices. For all other countries, income is insignifi-
cant. For Uruguay, there is some evidence that the coefficient on this variable
becomes unstable during crisis periods. 
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24In particular, Table 4 does not show the cointegration vectors that were found for each of the three
sectors. However, these vectors were, in fact, included in the estimations, and results for them can be
found in Martínez Pería (2000). The results for the error correction terms vary widely across countries.
The PPP error correction terms are significant in the case of Chile and Denmark, while the error correc-
tion term that can be interpreted as a UIP relationship is significant in the price equations for Denmark,
Japan, and Uruguay. The money error correction terms affect prices in the equations for Denmark and
Japan. Finally, wage cointegrating vectors are significant only for Denmark and Japan. In general, the
coefficients on the error correction terms are small, indicating that prices in these countries adjust slowly















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































tChanges in the exchange rate are largely significant and have a positive effect
on inflation. Thus, periods of exchange rate depreciations in these countries are
likely to be followed by a surge in inflation. With the exception of Malaysia, the
hypothesis can be accepted that the coefficient on this variable is stable.
Foreign price changes are, in general, positive and significant.25 On the other
hand, foreign interest rates are significant only in the cases of Colombia and
Uruguay. In general, the coefficients on foreign variables appear stable.
Domestic interest rates (typically, the rate of return on money and its outside
rate) have a negative significant impact on inflation. This is particularly the case
for Chile, Japan, Malaysia, and Uruguay. For Kenya and Denmark, the own rate
of return on money has a positive and significant effect. At 5 percent significance,
the coefficients on both kinds of interest rates are stable.
Wage changes are significant for Colombia and Uruguay at 5 percent signifi-
cance and for Denmark at 10 percent. In general, wage increases result in higher
inflation. On the other hand, increases in unemployment typically have a negative
impact on inflation, but they are only significant for the case of Chile and
Uruguay. The coefficients on some lags of the unemployment rate are unstable in
the case of Uruguay. Finally, changes in stock prices have no significant impact on
consumer price inflation across countries.26
The overall constancy of the estimated price equations is analyzed using the
same methodology discussed for the money demand equations. Figures 4A
through 4G show sequentially estimated one-period ahead and break-point Chow
statistics. Also, the Hansen variance, joint-variance, and coefficients-tests for
parameter constancy are reported in panel B of Table 3. In the Hansen tests, the
break-point date is unknown, so a finding of instability cannot be immediately
connected to a given period. Therefore, to examine whether the instability is a
result of banking crises, a Chow-type F-test (labeled F-CRISIS) is conducted as
before. This test compares the price equation results for the overall sample, with
the results obtained for the sample excluding the crisis period.
Both the Hansen and the break-point Chow tests indicate that the Chilean
price equation is stable. Also, F-CRISIS fails to find any evidence that the banking
crisis period led to instability in the price equation. Similar results are obtained for
the Danish and Malaysian price equations.
According to the sequentially estimated one-period ahead and break-point
Chow tests, the Colombian price equation appears stable. However, the Hansen
tests reject stability. In particular, these statistics point to variance instability.
These seemingly contradictory results can be reconciled by the fact that the recur-
sive estimations start well into the sample. In other words, the recursive Chow
tests are not very useful in this case, because they practically do not cover the
crisis period.27 The F-CRISIS test rejects the hypothesis that both periods can be
THE IMPACT OF BANKING CRISES ON MONEY DEMAND AND PRICE STABILITY
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25Foreign prices are measured by U.S. prices for all countries except for Denmark, where German
prices are included.
26Stock prices were only available for Chile, Colombia, and Japan.
27The Colombian crisis took place between 1982–88. Recursive estimations for the price equation



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)explained by the same equation. This seems to point to the fact that the price equa-
tion is particularly unstable during the banking crisis in Colombia.
Regarding the constancy of the Japanese price equation, the Hansen tests indi-
cate the presence of instability. However, this applies only to variance instability
and the evidence is marginal, since the critical value for the Hansen variance test
at 5 percent significance is roughly 0.5, and the test statistic is 0.52 (Hansen,
1992). Furthermore, the break-point Chow and F-CRISIS tests indicate parameter
constancy over the crisis period.
In the case of Kenya, the Hansen test for variance stability, the one-period
ahead, and the break-point Chow tests indicate that the equation is not constant. In
particular, it can be observed from the recursively estimated Chow tests that the
instability seems to occur during the 1990s. Kenya experienced two banking
crises, one over the period 1985–89 and another over the period 1992–95. The F-
test comparing the crisis in the 1980s with the tranquil observations suggests that
this period is not different from the overall sample. However, the 1990s crisis does
appear to be different from the tranquil period.
The evidence on stability for the Uruguayan price equation is mixed. The
Hansen test accepts stability, but F-CRISIS rejects it. Thus, there is a tendency to
rely on the F-CRISIS result. The one-period ahead and break-point Chow tests are
not useful in this case because the recursive estimations conducted to obtain these
tests start after the crisis period. However, it can be seen from the residual bands
that the estimation in the 1980s is less precise and stable than during the 1990s.
To  summarize, the results from this section indicate that money, exchange
rates, foreign prices, and domestic interest rates are significant in explaining prices
in most countries. Stock prices, on the other hand, did not prove to be useful indi-
cators of price behavior. In general, the relation between prices and individual
monetary indicators is stable, despite the occurrence of crises. In three out of seven
countries, however, evidence is found of (at least variance) instability in the price
equations.
IV. Conclusions
In the recent literature on banking crises, not much attention has been devoted to
the monetary impact of these episodes. Two exceptions, Garcia-Herrero (1997)
and Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal (1996), warn about some of the potential adverse
effects of banking crises for the conduct of monetary policy. In particular, using
mostly a descriptive approach, the authors argue that banking crises may have
significant implications for money demand stability and for the relation between
prices and monetary indicators. Though both of these studies are very interesting
and informative, they arrive at their conclusions without a systematic empirical
investigation of the issues. A recent study by Khamis and Leone (2001) conducts
a thorough empirical analysis of the impact of crises on currency demand stability.
However, the study focuses exclusively on the case of Mexico.
For a sample of developed and developing countries, using cointegration anal-
ysis and error correction modeling, this paper analyses the claim that banking
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stability of the process for inflation and the impact of crises on the coefficients of
individual monetary indicators were also analyzed.
The results suggest that the stability of money demand is not systematically
threatened by banking crises. With the exception of Uruguay, it was found that
money demand functions are stable. Regarding the indicators of price behavior,
changes in money, exchange rates, foreign prices, and domestic interest rates seem
to be useful in explaining prices. Finally, in three out of the seven countries, evidence
was uncovered of (primarily variance) instability in these equations due to crises.
Though undoubtedly more research is needed in this area, the results indicate
that the behavior of money demand during crises can be modeled by the same
function as during periods of tranquility. On the other hand, even though in general
individual coefficients in the price equations do not seem to be severely affected
by crises, it appears that crises can give rise to variance instability in the price
equations. Such instability may jeopardize the usefulness of these models to
conduct forecasts and to examine the impact of economic policies on prices.
This study has not conducted a thorough investigation as to why instability is
observed in some countries and not others. This important question is left for
future research. However, casual observation of the scope and cost of crises
suggests that there might be a link between the depth of crises and the countries
for which evidence of instability is found. On the other hand, there does not appear
to be a connection between the size of the banking sector and the subsequent cost







m = log of broad money (M2), p = log of CPI prices, y = log of industrial production, I
o =
interest rate on deposits from 30 to 89 days, p* = log of U.S. prices, i* = U.S. 6-month CD rate,
e = log of peso/dollar exchange rate, w = log of wage index, u = log of unemployment rate, and
sp = log of the share price index.
Data Frequency and Data Sources
Monthly. Exchange rate (pesos/U.S. dollars), M2, Chilean consumer price index, U.S.
consumer price index, U.S. 6-month CD rate, interest rate on deposits from 30 to 89 days, and
share price index (source, International Financial Statistics (IMF)). Unemployment rate
(source, UN Monthly Bulletin).
Quarterly. Industrial production and wage index (source, Central Bank of Chile).





m = log of broad money (M2), p = log of CPI prices, y = log of industrial production, I
o =
average interest rate for 90 day certificates of deposits, p* = log of U.S. prices, i* = U.S. 
6-month CD rate, e = log of peso/dollar exchange rate, w = log of wage index, u = log of unem-
ployment rate, sp = log of share price index.
Data Frequency and Data Sources
Monthly. Exchange rate (pesos/U.S. dollars), Colombian consumer price index, U.S.
consumer prices index, U.S. 6-month CD rate, and share price index (source, International
Financial Statistics (IMF)).  M2 and interest rate for 90-day certificates of deposit. (source,
Central Bank Monthly Bulletin).  Industrial production and wage index (source, Central Bank
and DANE monthly bulletin).





m = log of broad money (M2), p = log of CPI prices, y = log of industrial production, I
o =
average deposit rate, I
a = bond rate, p* = log of German prices, i* = German bond rate, e = log
of krone/deutsche mark exchange rate, w = log of wage index, and u = log of unemployment
rate.
Data Frequency and Data Sources
Monthly. Exchange rate (krone/deutsche mark), M2, industrial production, Danish
consumer price index, German consumer prices index, Danish deposit interest rate, Danish
government bond yield, and German government bond yield (source, International Financial
Statistics (IMF)). Unemployment rate and wage index (source, OECD Main Economic
Indicators).





m = log of broad money, p = log of CPI prices, y = log of industrial production, I
o = average
CD rate, I
a = gensaki rate, I = 10-year bond rate, I* = U.S. bond rate, p* = log of U.S. prices,
I* = U.S. bond rate, e = log of yen/dollar exchange rate, w = log of wage index, u = log of
unemployment rate, and sp = log of share price index.
Data Frequency and Data Sources
Monthly. Exchange rate (yen/U.S. dollar), Japanese consumer price index, U.S. consumer
price index, industrial production, U.S. government bond yield, and share price index (source,
International Financial Statistics (IMF)). M2 + CDs, Gensaki rate, CD rate, 10-year govern-





m = log of broad money, p = log of CPI prices, y = log of annually interpolated GDP, I
o =
average rate on deposits from two to six months, I
a = 90 day t-bill rate, I* = U.S. 6-month CD
rate, p* = log of U.S. prices, and e = log of shilling/dollar exchange rate.
Data Frequency and Data Sources
Monthly. Exchange rate (shillings/U.S. dollars), M2, Kenyan consumer price index, U.S.
consumer price index, interest rate on deposits from two to six months, and 90-day treasury bill
rate (source, International Financial Statistics (IMF)).
Annual. GDP (source, International Financial Statistics (IMF)).





m = log of broad money, p = log of CPI prices, y = log of industrial production, I
o = 3-month
deposit interest rates for commercial banks, I
a = 3-month deposit interest rates for financial
institutions, I* = U.S. 6-month CD rate, p* = log of U.S. prices, and e = log of ringgit/dollar
exchange rate.
Data Frequency and Data Sources
Monthly. Exchange rate (ringgit/U.S. dollar), M2, Malaysian consumer price index, U.S.
consumer price index, industrial production, and 3-month deposit interest rates for commercial
banks (source, International Financial Statistics (IMF)). Three-month deposit interest rates for





m = log of broad money, p = log of CPI prices, y = log of industrial production, I
o = interest
rate on 1- to 6-month deposits, I* = U.S. 6-month CD rate, p* = log of U.S. prices, e = log of
peso/dollar exchange rate, w = log of wages, and u = log of the unemployment rate.
Data Frequency and Data Sources
Monthly. Exchange rate (peso/U.S. dollar), M2, Uruguayan consumer price index, and
interest rate on 1- to 6-month deposits (source, International Financial Statistics (IMF)). Wage
index. (source, Central Bank bulletin).
Quarterly. Unemployment rate (source, CEPAL “Economic Survey”). Industrial produc-
tion (source, Central Bank bulletin).
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Table A1. Unit Root Tests Summary
Country Variable Order of Integration






Interest rate on money I(1)








Denmark Money (M2) I(2)
Prices I(2)
Income  I(1)
Krone/Deutschemark exchange rate I(1)
German prices I(1)
Interest rate on money I(1)
Interest rate on other financial assets not in M2 I(1)








Interest rates on money I(1)
Interest rate on other financial assets not in M2 I(1)
Wages I(2)
Unemployment I(1)Maria Soledad Martínez Pería
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Table A1. (concluded)




Dollar exchange rate I(1)
Interest rate on money I(1)
Interest rate on other financial assets not in M2 I(1)




Dollar exchange rate  I(1)
Interest rate on money I(1)
Interest rate on other domestic financial assets I(1)




Dollar exchange rate I(1)
Interest rate on money I(1)
U.S. CD rate I(1)
Wages I(2)
Unemployment I(1)
This table reports the order of integration of each variable according to the results from
augmented Dickey–Fuller (1981) unit root tests. Detailed results from these tests are reported in
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Table A2. Summary of Cointegration Tests: Number of Vectors
Country Monetary Sector Labor Sector External Sector
Chile 3 1 1
Colombia 2 1 3
Denmark 2 2 1
Japan 1 1 2
Kenya 3 n.a. 1
Malaysia 4 n.a. 1
Uruguay 1 1 2
This table summarizes the number of cointegrating vectors found by performing Johansen’s





a,∆ p,t] where m is the logarithm of nominal or real M2, p is the logarithm of consumer
prices, y is the logarithm of a measure of income, I
o is the rate of return on M2, and Ia is the return
on alternative assets to those included in M2, such as government bonds or bills. Finally, t is a time
trend. For the labor sector, if wages and prices are I(1), cointegration tests are conducted between the
variables in the vector Z
2a
t’=[w,u,p,t]. w corresponds to the logarithm of nominal wages, u is the log
of the unemployment rate, and p is the log of prices. For the countries where prices and wages are
I(2), cointegration is tested among the variables in the vector Z
2b
t’=[w-p,u,∆ p,t] where w-p is the real
wage (defined as the log of wages minus the log of prices). For the external sector, if domestic and
foreign prices are I(1), cointegration tests are conducted for the vector of variables 
Z
3a
t’=[p,e,p*,I,I*, t]. In this case, p corresponds to the logarithm of domestic prices, e is the log of the
exchange rate with respect to the U.S. dollar or deutsche mark depending on the country, p* is the
logarithm of the foreign price level (represented by the U.S. or German price level depending on the
country), I is the domestic interest rate, and I* is the corresponding foreign (U.S. or German) interest
rate. When there is evidence that domestic prices could be I(2), cointegration among the variables in 
Z
3b
t’=[p-e,p*,∆ p,I,I*] is examined. The remaining variables are defined above. Detailed results for the
Johansen tests can be found in Martínez Pería (2000). n.a. indicates that data on wages and unem-
ployment was not available, therefore cointegration tests for the labor sector were not performed in
these cases.Maria Soledad Martínez Pería
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Table A3. Cointegration Vector Results–Monetary Sector
Country Vector Name Cointegration Vector
Chile ChiECrM2 m–p = –0.031*∆ p +  y+0.0035*t
(0.003) (0.0005)




Colombia ColECnM2 m = p+ y+0.0018*t
(0.0002)
ColECIown I
O = – 0.0308*t
(0.0089)




DenECinfl ∆ p = 0.007*y+0.002*I
O–0.001*I
A–0.003*capcon–0.00002t
(0.002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0009) (0.0000)




Kenya KenECnM2 m = p+y–0.24*I
A+0.017*t
(0.006) (0.003)







Malaysia MysECrM2 m–p = –0.25*∆ p+y








Uruguay UruECrM2 m–p = –0.017*∆ p+y+0.018*I
o+0.003*t
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001)THE IMPACT OF BANKING CRISES ON MONEY DEMAND AND PRICE STABILITY
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Table A3. Cointegration Vector Results–External Sector
Country Vector Name Cointegration Vector
Chile ChiECrPPP p–e = –0.051*∆ p+p*
(0.008)
Colombia ColECnPPP p–e = p*
ColECIdom I
ColECIfor I*
Denmark DenECrPPP p–e = –0.01*∆ p+p*
(0.002)
DenECuip I = ∆ p+I*–0.015*t
(0.006)
Japan JapECrPPP p–e = –0.164*∆ p+p*+0.005*t
(0.018) (0.001)
JapECuip I = ∆ p+I* + 0.024*t
(0.005)
Kenya KenECnPPP p–e = +p* +4.016*I –4.016*I* –0.337*t
(0.013) (0.062) 
KenECidiff I = +1.05*I* + 0.084*t
(0.016)
Malaysia MysECrPPP p–e = 0.269*∆ p +p*
(0.0529)
Uruguay UruECrPPP p–e = 0.007*∆ p +p* +0.006*t
(0.0026) (3.129)
UruECuip I = ∆ p +I* –0.049*t
(0.0181)Maria Soledad Martínez Pería
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Table A3. Cointegration Vector Results–Labor Sector
Country Vector Name Cointegration Vector
Chile ChiECrwage w–p = –0.01*∆ p–0.228*u–0.002*t
(0.002) (0.043) (0.0004)
Colombia ColECnwage w–p = +0.001*t
(0.0001)
Denmark DenECrwage w–p = –0.042*∆ p–1.26*u+0.027*t
(0.024) (0.293) (0.001)
Japan JapECrwage w–p = 0.029*∆ p+0.001*t+0.007*DJuneT–0.007*DJuneT
(0.008) (0.0002) (0.001)
Kenya No data on wages and unemployment available.
Malaysia No data on wages and unemployment available.
Uruguay UruECrwage w–p = –0.0025*∆ p – 0.348*u
(0.0006) (0.0486)
This table reports the cointegrating vectors found by performing Johansen’s (1988) cointegration
tests for each sector where: m is the logarithm of nominal or real M2 (depending on the order of inte-
gration of M2), y is the logarithm of a measure of income (usually industrial production), I
o is the rate
of return on M2 (in most cases an average deposit rate), and I
A is the return on alternative assets to
those included in M2, such as government bonds or bills, t is a time trend, w corresponds to the loga-
rithm of nominal wages, u is the log of the unemployment rate, p is the log of prices, w–p is the real
wage, ∆ p is the inflation rate, e is the log of the exchange rate with respect to the U.S. dollar or
deutschemark depending on the country, p* is the logarithm of the foreign price level (represented by
the U.S. or German price level depending on the country), I is the domestic interest rate, and I* is the
corresponding foreign (U.S. or German) interest rate. Finally, DJuneT and DJulyT are dummies that
equal 1 in June and July, respectively, interacted by a monthly time trend. These dummies are
included in the wage equations for Japan to control for bonus payments that occur during these
months. Capcon is a dummy that equals 1 for the period January 1983 through February 1998, the
period after the removal of capital controls. Detailed results for the Johansen tests can be found in
Martínez Pería, 2000.REFERENCES
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